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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE-SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION-The United States Supreme
Court held that the erection and display of a cross by the Ku
Klux Klan on state-owned land surrounding a state capital does
not violate the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution.
Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
Capitol Square is a state-owned plaza that surrounds the seat
of government in Columbus, Ohio.' In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan
(the "KKK") submitted an application to the Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Board (the "Board") requesting issuance of
a permit allowing the erection and display of an unattended
cross on the square.2 Several groups, including homosexual
rights organizations and the United Way, had previously been
given permission by the Board to hold rallies on Capitol
Square.' Additionally, the Board had also permitted unattended
displays on the square, including a state-sponsored Christmas
tree and a privately-sponsored menorah during Chanukah.' The
Board denied the KKK's application to erect and display the
cross and informed the KKK that the decision was based on a
good faith attempt to comply with the United States and Ohio
Constitutions.'
The KKK brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio seeking an injunction mandating
that the Board issue the permit as requested.6 The Board
1. Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2444 (1995). The
square is a 10 acre tract of land. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2444.
2. Id. at 2445. The Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board was given the
responsibility of regulating public access to the square pursuant to an Ohio statute.
Id. at 2444. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 105.41 (Anderson 1994) (granting the regu-
latory responsibility).
3. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2444. The Board's purpose is "to allow a
broad range of speakers and other gatherings of people to conduct events on Capitol
Square." Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2445.
6. Id. Generally, the term "injunction" refers to an order by a court either,
(1) prohibiting someone from doing an act, or (2) commanding someone to undo some
wrong. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 784 (6th ed. 1990). The type of injunction sought
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defended its refusal to issue the permit on the ground that the
erection and display of the unattended cross on Capitol Square
would violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.7 The district court rejected the Board's argument,
granted the injunction, and the permit was issued. The Board
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit for an emergency stay' from the order of the district
court which was denied, and the KKK cross was erected on
Capitol Square for the full length of time specified by the
permit."0
On appeal on the merits, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court." The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court's
decisions in Lemon v. Kurtzman," Lynch v. Donnelly, 3 and
Allegheny County v. ACLU,' 4 as controlling with respect to gov-
ernment-sponsored displays of religious symbols." However,
the Sixth Circuit distinguished the KKK display from
government-sponsored displays. 6 Thus, the Sixth Circuit relied
here was a "mandatory injunction," meaning an injunction which prohibits refusal to
"do or permit some act to which the plaintiff has a legal right." Id.
7. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2445. The First Amendment's Establishment
Clause provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2445. The district court concluded that the
square is a 'traditional public forum open to all without any policy against free-
standing displays." Id. Additionally, the district court characterized the KKK cross as
the type of private expression protected by the First Amendment, and concluded that
the Board had failed to show that the cross' existence on the square could reason-
ably be considered a state endorsement. Id.
9. A stay is used to stop the execution of a judgment. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 1413 (6th ed. 1990).
10. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2445. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 114 S. Ct. 626 (denying the stay). The permit allowed the cross to be
placed on Capitol Square from December 17, 1993 to December 24, 1993. Capitol
Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2445. Justice Stevens, as circuit justice for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 42 (1994), decided
the Board's petition. See Capitol Square, 114 S. Ct. at 626. The Board's request was
denied by Justice Stevens because: (1) it was to be taken down the following day,
and, as such, whatever harm resulted from its display had already occurred, and (2)
Justice Stevens concluded that the issue would not become moot owing to its capa-
bility of repetition, thus allowing the Court time to render a full opinion at a later
date. See id. (denying the Board's petition for an emergency stay of the district
court's order).
11. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir.
1994), afld, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
12. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
13. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
14. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
15. Capitol Square, 30 F.3d at 678-79.
16. Id. at 679. The Sixth Circuit found that the KKK cross was a private dis-
play erected upon a "traditional public forum." Id. The Sixth Circuit distinguished
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heavily upon one of its prior decisions rather than Supreme
Court decisions in deciding the case. 7 The Sixth Circuit held
that erection of the KKK cross on Capitol Square did not violate
the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.'
8
The United States Supreme Court granted the Board's
petition for certiorari 9 in order to settle the dispute among the
circuit courts regarding the issue of whether privately sponsored
displays of religious symbols in public forums violate the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.0 The
Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit." The Court began its analysis22 by indicating
that it would address only the issue pertaining to the Estab-
lishment Clause.23 The broad issue addressed by the Supreme
Court was whether a state may implement a religiously neutral
policy, but yet violate the Establishment Clause when allowing a
private actor to display "an unattended religious symbol" in a
public forum.24
the KKK cross from the creche at issue in Allegheny County by noting that the
Allegheny County creche was not displayed in a "traditional public forum." Id. See
Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that a privately sponsored
creche displayed in the City-County building in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania violated the
Establishment Clause).
17. See Capitol Square, 30 F.3d at 679 (relying on the Sixth Circuit decision
in Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d
1538 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that a private display of a menorah in a
public forum did not violate the Establishment Clause)).
18. Id. at 676.
19. A writ of certiorari, as used here, is a device enabling the Supreme Court
to employ its discretion in selecting the cases that it will hear. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 228 (6th ed. 1990).
20. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2445. The Court noted that the Sixth
Circuit's decision was in agreement with the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Chabad-
Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the State of Georgia
did not violate the Establishment Clause by permitting a menorah to be displayed
in the rotunda of the state capitol under a content-neutral policy), but disagreed
with the Second and Fourth Circuits. Id. See generally Chabad-Lubavitch v.
Burlington, 936 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that issuance of an injunction deny-
ing an application to place a menorah in a city park is proper content-based regula-
tion), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992); Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F.2d
953 (4th Cir.) (invalidating placement of a nativity scene on the front lawn of a
county office building, thus affirming content-based regulation on speech), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 74 (1990).
21. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2450.
22. Id. at 2444. Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion in four parts. Id.
With respect to Parts I, II, and III, Justice Scalia's opinion was that of the Court.
Id. With respect to Part IV, however, Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 2444, 2447.
23. Id. at 2445. The KKK asserted in its brief and oral argument that the
Board's decision actually rested upon its disagreement with the KKK's political
views. Id.
24. Id. at 2444.
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The Court recognized that in its prior decisions a state's
interest in complying with the Establishment Clause was held
sufficient to support "content based regulation"" in certain
circumstances." Thus, the Supreme Court specifically
addressed the issue of whether the KKK's expression would
impede Ohio's interest in complying with the Establishment
Clause sufficiently to justify the Board's "content-based
regulation," denying the KKK access to Capitol Square.27 In its
analysis, the plurality addressed the "endorsement test,"
28
relied on by the Board, as it was applied in Allegheny County
and Lynch.2 9
The plurality distinguished Allegheny County and Lynch
factually from Capitol Square and placed particular emphasis on
the location of the displays in Allegheny County and Lynch, and
the location of the cross in the instant case.3 ° More importantly,
however, the plurality clarified its prior tests for the endorse-
ment of religion, and emphasized that the subject of those tests
was either governmental expression itself or governmental
action that was allegedly discriminatory in favor of private
religious expression.31  The plurality distinguished these
considerations from the instant case because the KKK's cross
was privately sponsored and was located in a forum traditionally
open to the public for such purposes.32 Thus, the plurality
refused to apply the "endorsement test" to the instant case, for
to do so, the plurality reasoned, would be to create, in effect, a
new "transferred endorsement test."3 Such a test, the plurality
25. Id. at 2446. "Content-based regulation" means, as in this case, that a state
may deny private individuals access to public forums if such a restriction is neces-
sary to serve a "compelling state interest" and is manifest through "narrowly drawn"
regulation. Id.
26. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446. The Court cited Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2143-49 (1993) (holding that
a public school district's interest in complying with the Establishment Clause is not
sufficient grounds upon which to deny individuals the right to use school property
for private religious purposes during off-hours, where the same premises had been
used for a variety of civic, social and recreational purposes). Id. Also, the Court cited
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269, 274 (1981) (holding that a public university
cannot exclude religious groups from facilities available to other student groups un-
der an open forum policy). Id.
27. Id. at 2446-47.
28. Id. at 2447. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In Lynch, Justice O'Connor stated: "Every government practice must be
judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694.
29. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2448.
30. Id. at 2447.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2447-48. Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, stated:
1212 Vol. 34:1209
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concluded, would run contrary to the long-established principle
that neutral governmental action, which benefits religion, is not
in violation of the Establishment Clause.34
Moreover, the plurality noted that there was no need to apply
such a test in the instant case, because the private display was
located on a public forum that had been used in a similar
manner for several years. 5 The plurality emphasized that such
a conclusion was implicit in previous Supreme Court
decisions.36 Therefore, the Court held that the display of the
KKK cross on Capitol Square, a traditional public forum, did not
violate the Establishment Clause.37  Moreover, the Court
reasoned that sectarian displays in an area commonly accepted
as a forum for public expression do not violate the
Establishment Clause.38
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas supported the Court's
decision. 9 However, Justice Thomas emphasized that the
KKK's display of the cross was intended to convey more than a
religious message, it was also intended to convey a political
message.4
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Breyer and Souter,
objected to the plurality's reasoning, although all three Justices
ultimately concurred in the judgment of the Court.4 ' Justice
O'Connor concluded that the plurality created an unnecessary
And as a matter of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we have consistently
held that it is no violation for government to enact neutral policies that hap-
pen to benefit religion. .... The test petitioners propose, which would attribute
to a neutrally behaving government private religious expression, has no ante-
cedent in our jurisprudence, and would better be called a "transferred endorse-
ment" test.
Id.
34. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447.
35. Id. at 2448.
36. Id. See supra note 26 for a discussion of Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) and Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981). The plurality conceded that it could envision circumstances in which
a government may manipulate its control of a public forum in favor of a certain
religion. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2449. However, the plurality stressed that
such circumstances did not exist in the instant case. Id.
37. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2450. The Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's
judgment granting the injunction that forced the Board to allow the KKK's cross to
be erected, placed, and maintained on Capitol Square. Id.
38. Id. Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia stated: "Religious expression
cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it is purely private and occurs in a
traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal
terms." Id.
39. Id. at 2450 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 2451. Justice Thomas stated: [T]he Klan had a primarily nonreli-
gious purpose in erecting the cross." Id.
41. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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exception to the "endorsement test." 2 Moreover, Justice
O'Connor opined that the "endorsement test" must necessarily
be applied in situations such as the instant case, because the
test focuses on the "reasonable, informed observer's "' per-
ception of such displays." Thus, Justice O'Connor reasoned, the
"endorsement test" protects citizens from those assertions by a
government that manifest an active violation of the
Establishment Clause.' Moreover, Justice O'Connor reasoned
that the "endorsement test" also protects citizens from equally
damaging inactive assertions that provoke a "reasonably
informed observer" to conclude that the government favors or
endorses a particular religion.46 Justice O'Connor emphasized
that many lower courts have applied the "endorsement test" in
similar situations and have reached informed decisions with
relative ease.47 Therefore, Justice O'Connor asserted that when
a reasonable observer views a display as a governmental en-
dorsement of religion, courts have a duty to invalidate such a
practice in light of the Establishment Clause.' Applying this
approach to the instant case, Justice O'Connor concluded that
the KKK's display did not violate the Establishment Clause."9
Justice O'Connor strongly suggested, however, that an adequate
"disclaimer" attached to such a display should become common
practice in the future."
Justice Souter joined Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
and filed a separate concurrence precisely because of the
possibility of affixing a "disclaimer" to private, unattended
displays.51 Justice Souter's chief contention, like that of Justice
O'Connor, was that the "endorsement test" must be applied to
42. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2451.
43. Id. Justice O'Connor likened the "reasonable, informed observer" to tort
law's "reasonable person." Id. at 2455.
44. Id. at 2451-52.
45. Id.
46. Id. Justice O'Connor expressed the view that there are situations in which
a message of endorsement could be sent without direct governmental action. Id. at
2452.
47. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2453. Justice O'Connor asserted her dis-
agreement with the plurality's opinion that applying the endorsement test in this
and similar situations would needlessly increase the burden on the judiciary. Id.
48. Id. at 2454. Justice O'Connor rejected the plurality's notion that cases
such as the instant case can be decided with a "per se" rule. Id. Justice O'Connor
stated that each situation must be considered in light of its unique circumstances.
Id. Interestingly, an approach such as the approach proposed by Justice O'Connor
was precisely the type of approach that the plurality sought to avoid. Id. at 2449.
49. Id. at 2457.
50. Id. at 2453.
51. Id. at 2457 (Souter, J., concurring).
1214 Vol. 34:1209
the facts of Capitol Square.52 In Justice Souter's opinion, how-
ever, the test must be applied from the perspective of an
"intelligent observer."53 Justice Souter paid particular attention
to the Allegheny County decision." Justice Souter contended
that the "endorsement test" established in Allegheny County
must not be limited to circumstances in which a government has
taken some action of its own.5 Moreover, in the analysis of the
Court's prior and subsequent holdings on this issue, Justice
Souter emphasized that employment of the suggested test was
"extant," either implicitly or explicitly, in each case.5" Thus,
Justice Souter argued that the plurality's proposed "per se"
rule57 leaves open the possibility for unconstitutional religious
expression by a government vis-a-vis private displays on public
property."
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens reasoned that the
Court should begin its analysis by presuming that the
installation of unattended religious symbols on public property
is strongly disfavored." Working from this presumption,
Justice Stevens' consideration of the facts in Capitol Square led
him to conclude that the display of the KKK cross was in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment."0  Justice Stevens rejected the various tests
espoused by the plurality and found that a strict constitutional
interpretation affords governments considerable latitude to deny
private individuals and/or organizations access to public lands
for religious purposes.6 1
Justice Ginsburg also authored a dissenting opinion in which




56. Id. at 2458-60.
57. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2460. Justice Souter referred to the
plurality's assertion that there can be no Establishment Clause violation when a
religious expression is: (1) purely private, and (2) occurs in an open, public forum.
Id. at 2450.
58. Id. at 2461. Justice Souter contended that governments may, under the
rule adopted by the plurality, manipulate public forums in favor of certain religious
displays and speakers. Id. Also, Justice Souter concluded that adequate disclaimers
should be required in the future in order to avoid the suggestion of governmental
endorsement. Id.
59. Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2465-73. Facts of particular import to Justice Stevens included: (1)
the cross was unattended and unadorned with a visible disclaimer; (2) the cross was
in extreme close proximity to the seat of government; and (3) the cross was clearly
on government property. Id.
61. Id. at 2465-69.
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she considered the facts of the case in light of the presumption
that the Establishment Clause seeks to "uncouple" government
from religion. 2 From this position, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that the KKK's display on Capitol Square violated the goal of
the Establishment Clause and, hence, was unconstitutional.63
An analysis of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence reveals much about the Court's decision in Capitol
Square. In Everson v. Board of Education," the Supreme Court
considered whether a state statute that reimburses parents of
parochial school children for bus transportation violates the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment.' The Court's
analysis began with a consideration of the historical
underpinnings of the Establishment Clause.66  The Court
acknowledged that the Establishment Clause requires states to
act neutrally with respect to religion and religious practices. 7
The Court also acknowledged, however, that the Establishment
Clause does not require states to act in a hostile manner toward
religion.68 The Court next addressed the state statute at issue
in light of the Establishment Clause.69 The Court concluded
that state legislation must not favor any religion and, thus,
oppress the free exercise of religion.7" The Court held that all
students are entitled to safe transportation to and from school
and thus, the statute in question did not violate the
Establishment Clause.71 Justice Black, writing for the majority,
implied, however, that the state statute at issue in Everson
reached the brink of permissible legislation under the Estab-
lishment Clause.72
62. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2474 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
65. Everson, 330 U.S. at 5. The Court acknowledged its previous decision in
Cantwel v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment is binding on the states pursuant to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Id. at 15.
66. Id. at 10-13. The Court noted that strife existed between those American
colonists who were members of religious minorities in England and those who were
members of the English religious majority. Id. The Court reasoned that the First
Amendment was adopted in order to prevent those members of the English majority
living in the colonies from displaying their hostilities toward members of other reli-
gions. Id.
67. Id. at 18.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
71. Id. at 16-18. The Court stated that public welfare legislation benefiting re-
ligion in other forms, including police and fire protection and road construction and
maintenance are also constitutionally valid. Id.
72. Id. at 16.
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In Engle v. Vitale,73 the Court considered whether a daily
classroom prayer recited in New York public schools violated the
Establishment Clause.74 The Court first determined that the
twenty-two-word prayer used in the schools constituted a
religious activity.75 In discussing the Establishment Clause, the
Court concluded that direct governmental coercion in favor of a
particular religion is not necessary to violate religious
freedom.7" Rather, the Court found that any union of
government and religion may serve to foster acrimony between a
portion of the citizenry and the government." Thus, the Court
found that indirect governmental action may violate the
Establishment Clause.7 The Court held, therefore, that recital
of a daily prayer in New York public schools is an improper
practice in violation of the Establishment Clause."
The following year, the Court was faced with a remarkably
similar issue in Abington School District v. Schempp.0 In
Schempp, the Court considered whether two state statutes that
provided for the practice of opening each public school day with
a reading from the Bible violated the Establishment Clause."
Both statutes provided for opening exercises each school
morning during which students wishing to participate read
passages from various scriptures over the schools' public address
systems."2 The Court began its analysis with an extensive
review of Establishment Clause cases, culminating in the
Court's Engle decision a year prior.8" Applying the law as out-
lined in the previous Establishment Clause decisions to the case
before it, the Court determined that the readings constituted a
governmentally mandated religious exercise.8 ' Thus, the Court
73. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
74. Engle, 370 U.S. at 422-23.
75. Id. at 424.
76. Id. at 430-31.
77. Id. The Court stated: "When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pres-
sure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved reli-
gion is plain." Id. at 431.
78. Id at 431.
79. Engle, 370 U.S. at 433.
80. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
81. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205. The Court's opinion addressed two companion
cases, one from Pennsylvania and one from Maryland. Id. at 205-12.
82. Id. at 205-12. The exercises consisted solely of reading and no comments
were made or questions posed to the students. Id. Additionally, those students who
did not want to participate were allowed to abstain after presenting written permis-
sion from their parents to school officials. Id.
83. Id. at 220-21.
84. Id. at 223.
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found the schools' practice an unconstitutional violation of the
Establishment Clause. 5 Moreover, the Court asserted that
allowing students the option not to participate in religious exer-
cises does not mitigate the unconstitutionality of the practice.86
The next significant case in the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Lemon v. Kurtzman,"7
concerned two state statutes that provided financial aid to pri-
vate religious schools.8 In Lemon, the Court announced a
three-part test to determine whether a state action violates the
Establishment Clause. 9 First, the Court concluded that the
purpose of a statute must be secular in order to withstand a
constitutional challenge.90 Next, the Court asserted that the
effect of a statute must be such that it "neither advances nor
inhibits religion.""1 Finally, the Court required that the statute
"must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."'92 Applying this test to the statutes in question in
Lemon, the Court reasoned that the statutes constituted a sig-
nificant state involvement with religion. 3 Therefore, the Court
held that both statutes evidenced an unacceptable measure of
entanglement and were thus in violation of the First
Amendment."'
The issue before the Supreme Court in Hunt v. McNair95 was
85. Id. at 224-25.
86. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224-25.
87. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In 1970, the Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether state tax exemptions for religious organizations violate the Establishment
Clause. See Walh v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Court's analysis was
two-fold. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73. First, the Court concluded that the statute's
purpose was not to sponsor religion. Id. at 672. Next, the Court concluded that the
statute only indirectly benefited members of various religions. Id. at 673. Thus, the
Supreme Court held in Walz that when a statute has only an indirect and benign
effect upon religion, the Establishment Clause is not violated. Id. at 675.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Engle, Schempp, and Walz provided the
basis for the Lemon test, used subsequently to determine whether a state action is
in violation of the Establishment Clause.
88. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-10. In Pennsylvania, nonpublic schools received
reimbursement for teachers' salaries and school materials pursuant to a state stat-
ute. Id. at 609. Pursuant to a Rhode Island statute, nonpublic school teachers re-
ceived a supplemental 15% of their annual salary from the state. Id. at 607.
89. Id. at 612.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 613.
93. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. The Court noted that "total separation between
church and state" is impossible. Id. at 614.
94. Id. at 614. The Court stated: "Every analysis in this area must begin with
consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases." Id. at 612.
95. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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whether a statute allowing for state financing of physical
improvements to the campus of a private religious college
constituted significant involvement between government and
religion so as to render the statute unconstitutional." The
Court adopted the three-pronged Lemon test to analyze the
state's activity."s However, Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, stated that the three prongs constitute no more than
"helpful signposts."98 Nevertheless, the Court determined that
the statute in question had neither a religious purpose, nor the
effect of favoring a particular religion.99 In addition, the Court
determined that the degree of entanglement between
government and religion resulting from the statute was not
beyond the degree acceptable under the Establishment Clause
doctrine."° The Court held, therefore, that public financing of
secular projects undertaken by private, religious colleges is
within the acceptable limits of governmental entanglement with
religion."'
In Widmar v. Vincent,"°2 the Court was presented with the
question of whether a state's interest in complying with the
Establishment Clause is sufficient to permit "content-based
regulation" of private speech.'03 Thus the Court was confronted
with a case in which the First Amendment's Establishment and
Free Speech Clauses were in conflict. ' In Widmar, a state
university refused to grant a registered student group access to
a university facility because the group had a primarily religious
purpose."' The university defended its decision by asserting
that allowance of access to the group would violate the
96. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 740. The statute in question provided for the issuance
of bonds to colleges and universities within the state to finance any school "projects,"
excluding those for sectarian purposes or for the purpose of religious worship. Id. at
736. In the instant case, the challenged bonds were to finance a Baptist college's
capital improvements and construction of a dining hall facility. Id. at 738.
97. Id. at 736-47.
98. Id. at 741.
99. Id. at 741-45. The Court concluded that the purpose of the statute was
primarily secular in nature. Id. at 741. Additionally, the Court concluded that the
statute's "primary effect" would not be to enhance or inhibit religion. Id. at 745.
100. Id. at 748-49. The Supreme Court placed great emphasis on the statute's
self-imposed confinement to financing of secular projects in reaching the determina-
tion that the governmental entanglement was not sufficient to warrant rendering the
statute constitutionally invalid. Id.
101. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 749.
102. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
103. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70.
104. Id. at 263.
105. Id. at 265. The group, named "Cornerstone," sought permission to use uni-




Establishment Clause."'6  The students alleged that the
university's refusal to allow them access to facilities open to
other students was an unconstitutional infringement upon their
First Amendment right to free speech.'
The Court assessed the validity of the university's argument
that it had a "compelling state interest" through employment of
the "Lemon test." s Allowing religious groups to hold meetings
in university facilities that are open to all other students, the
Court concluded, does not result in governmental "entan-
glement" sufficient to warrant denial of students' rights to free
speech."° The Widmar Court held that the university's interest
was not sufficiently "compelling" to justify its content-based reg-
ulation of speech."
In Marsh v. Chambers,"' the Court addressed the issue of
whether a legislature's practice of beginning each day with a
prayer violated the Establishment Clause."' The majority in
Marsh held the practice valid in deference to historical
tradition.'
In Marsh, the dissenting opinion, authored by Justice
Brennan, acknowledged the majority's failure to apply the three-
pronged analysis employed in the Court's prior decisions."4
Such an analysis, Justice Brennan concluded, would
undoubtedly lead to a finding that the practice was invalid
under the Establishment Clause. "'
106. Id. at 270. The university claimed that under the parameters set forth by
the Supreme Court in Lemon and its progeny, the university had a "compelling state
interest" sufficient to justify the university's refusal to grant access to Cornerstone
based on the religious content of its meetings. Id. at 270-71.
107. Id. at 266.
108. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-76.
109. Id. at 275-76.
110. Id. at 276-77. The Court stated: "Our cases have required the most exact-
ing scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of
content." Id. at 276.
111. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
112. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. For many years it has been the practice of the
Nebraska legislature to open each day with a prayer read by a chaplain who is paid
with public funds. Id. at 784-85.
113. Id. at 784-95. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, expressed the
opinion that such a practice: (1) is not an endorsement of a particular religion de-
spite the fact that a single chaplain had been reciting the prayer for 16 years, and
(2) is not the type of practice intended to be invalidated by the Framers of the Con-
stitution. Id. at 793, 788-92.
114. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. Justice Brennan stated: "In sum, I have no doubt that, if any group of
law students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legis-
lative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitution-
al." Id. at 800-01.
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In Lynch v. Donnelly,'16 the Court faced the issue of whether
a city-sponsored nativity scene in a Christmas display on private
land constitutes an Establishment Clause violation.' 7 The
Court first acknowledged that the history of the United States
Government is replete with references to religious traditions,
themes and messages."' Thus, the Court determined that
Establishment Clause cases require individual analysis rather
than employment of a fixed per se rule."' The Court opined
that the analysis of the facts in the instant case must be within
the context of the Christmas season. 2' From this perspective,
the Court narrowed the issue to whether the creche in question
had a secular purpose.' 2' The Court equated the display, and
the creche within it, with the religious references that have his-
torically been accepted, rather than with those references that
have been held as unconstitutional "entanglements" between
government and religion.'22 The Court concluded that there
was a secular purpose for including the creche in the dis-
play."2 Thus, notwithstanding the creche's religious signif-
icance, the Court held that the creche's presence in the
Christmas display did not violate the Establishment Clause.' 24
The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would require many
of the accepted forms of the nation's "religious heritage" be
likewise held unconstitutional. 2'
Although Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment of the
Court, she rejected the Court's reasoning and proposed a new
test for use in cases involving the Establishment Clause.'26
Justice O'Connor criticized the utility of the long-standing
Lemon test and proposed that its principles be incorporated into
116. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
117. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670-71.
118. Id. at 674-78. Specifically, the Court mentioned: observance of Christmas
as a National Holiday, the national motto "In God We Trust," and the display of
over 200 religious paintings in the National Gallery. Id. at 676-77.
119. Id. at 678. The Court stated: 'The Clause erects a 'blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." Id.
at 679 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
120. Id. at 679.
121. Id.
122. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-80. The Court stated: "We hold only that
Pawtucket has a secular purpose for its display, which is all that Lemon requires."
Id. at 681 n.6.
123. Id. at 684.
124. Id. at 687.
125. Id. at 686. The Court stated: "It is far too late in the day to impose a
crabbed reading of the Clause on the country." 1d. at 687.
126. Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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a new analysis. 1' Thus, Justice O'Connor framed the issue
differently--considering whether the display of the creche con-
stituted an endorsement of religion by the city. 2s Justice
O'Connor's analysis of this issue incorporated the Lemon test's
"purpose" and "effect" prongs. 29 Justice O'Connor's analysis
placed great emphasis, however, upon consideration of whether
a city's display of a creche would lead a reasonable observer to
perceive that the government endorsed a particular religion.3 '
Applying this analysis to the city's display, Justice O'Connor
first concluded that the city did not intend to convey a message
of religious endorsement.' 3' In addition, Justice O'Connor
concluded that the display did not have the effect of
communicating governmental endorsement of religion.'32
Therefore, Justice O'Connor found, as did the majority, that the
city's display of the creche did not violate the Establishment
Clause under the circumstances.'33
In Wallace v. Jaffree,' the Court was called upon to decide
the constitutionality of an Alabama statute which prescribed a
moment of silence to be observed in public schools each
morning.' 5 The Court's analysis of the statute in light of the
Lemon test revealed that the statute's purpose was not secular,
rather, it was to endorse religion.' 6 Thus, the Court declared
the statute invalid as against the Establishment Clause of the
127. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
128. Id. at 690.
129. Id. Justice O'Connor stated: "To answer [the issue] we must examine both
what [the city] intended to communicate in displaying the creche and what message
the city's display actually conveyed. The purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test
represent these two aspects of the city's action." Id.
130. Id. at 692. Justice O'Connor asserted further that only those practices that
have the effect of endorsing religion and thus making a person's religious beliefs
relevant to their standing in the community should be of a concern to the Court. Id.
131. Id. at 691.
132. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692. In reaching this conclusion, Justice O'Connor as-
serted that, under the circumstances, the display was no more a governmental en-
dorsement of religion than traditionally accepted "acknowledgments" of religion. Id.
According to Justice O'Connor, accepted "acknowledgments" of religion include: legis-
lative prayers of the type held constitutional by the Supreme Court in Marsh, gov-
ernmental acknowledgments of religious holidays as national holidays, and the print-
ing of the phrase "In God We Trust" on United States currency. Id. at 692-93.
133. Id. at 694.
134. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
135. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40.
136. Id. at 59-60. At trial, there was evidence presented to the district court
concerning Alabama Governor Fob James' statements admitting the religious purpose
of the statute. Id. at 57 n.44. In addition, the Court acknowledged the district
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In Allegheny County v. ACLU, 3' the Court considered the
similar issue of whether a display of a creche and a menorah on
government property during the Christmas season violates the
Establishment Clause.3 ' The Court utilized the "endorsement
test" set forth by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in
Lynch.'" In so doing, the Court criticized the majority opinion
in Lynch for its lack of guidance as to what is and is not
permissible under the Establishment Clause.' Applying the
"endorsement test" to the creche at issue in the case, the Court
considered the use of religious symbolism in the context in
which it was displayed. Viewing the creche in this way, the
Court concluded that the creche constituted an endorsement of
religion sufficient to violate the Establishment Clause." Ap-
plying the same analysis to the menorah, however, the Court
concluded that under the circumstances in which it was
displayed, display of the menorah did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause.'"
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test was the subject of a
blistering attack levied by Justice Kennedy in a
concurring/dissenting opinion.'" Justice Kennedy's opinion
advanced a new approach to the Establishment Clause is-
sue-the "coercion test."' The first prong of the test requires
137. Id. at 60-61.
138. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
139. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 578. At issue was a creche displayed in the
"Grand Staircase" of the City-County building in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and an
18-foot menorah placed outside the building. Id. at 573. Atop the creche was written
the words: "Gloria in Excesis Deo," meaning "Glory to God in the Highest." Id. Next
to the menorah stood a Christmas tree at the foot of which was a sign proclaiming
that the display was the City's "salute to liberty." Id.
140. Id. at 593-94.
141. id. at 594.
142. Id. at 597.
143. Id. at 612-13. The Court distinguished the creche in this case from the
one displayed in Lynch, in that the creche in Lynch was part of a larger display
replete with secular imagery. Id. at 598. The Court cautioned, however, that "a
secular state ... is not the same as an atheistic or antireligious state." Id. at 610.
144. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 620. The Court stated: "[lit is not 'suffi-
ciently likely' that the residents of Pittsburgh will perceive the combined display of
the tree, the sign, and the menorah as an 'endorsement' or 'disapproval ... of indi-
vidual religious choices.'" Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor defended the
use of the "endorsement test," stating: "We cannot avoid the obligation to draw lines,
often close and difficult lines, in deciding Establishment Clause cases, and that is
not a problem unique to the endorsement test." Id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justic-
es White and Scalia joined in Justice Kennedy's opinion. Id.
146. Id. at 659-60. The "coercion test" has also been referred to as the
"proselytization test." Id.
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that governments not coerce any person to subscribe to or par-
ticipate in any religion or the exercise thereof.'47 The second
prong of the test requires that governments not act in any man-
ner sufficient to benefit religion to the extent that it establishes
a state religion, or has that potential.' Justice Kennedy as-
serted that the majority's rule, and the analysis employed by
Justice O'Connor in her concurrence, lacked the "play in the
joints" necessary to permit a workable interpretation of the
Establishment Clause.'49 Thus, employing this analysis to the
case, Justice Kennedy concluded that display of neither the
menorah, nor the creche, violated the Clause.1
50
In 1993, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District,5' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a public school, under an open forum policy, can deny a
religious group access to school facilities in light of the
Establishment Clause." 2 In its analysis, the Court analogized
the facts of the instant case to those in Widnar. '5 The Court
renewed its Widmar analysis, however, to reflect the
147. Id. at 659.
148. Id. Justice Kennedy noted: "[Cloercion need not be a direct tax in aid of
religion or a test oath. Symbolic recognition or accommodation of religious faith may
violate the Clause in the extreme case." Id. at 661. In a concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor remarked:
An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only "coercive" practices or
overt efforts at government proselytization, but fails to take account of the
numerous more subtle ways that government can show favoritism to particular
beliefs or convey a message of disapproval to others, would not, in my view,
adequately protect the religious liberty or respect the religious diversity of the
members of our pluralistic political community.
Id. at 627-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 661-62. Justice Kennedy stated: "[F]ew of
our traditional practices recognizing the part religion plays in our society can with-
stand scrutiny under the faithful application of [the endorsement test]." Id. at 670.
150. Id. at 678-79. Justice Kennedy asserted that, although the decision to
display the creche and menorah was not one he would have made had he been in
such a position, it is not the role of the Court to act as a "censor" as to what is
and is not 'orthodox" or "secular." Id. The majority stated that Justice Kennedy's
opinion was based on a misreading of Marsh. Id. at 603-04.
151. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Prior to this case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit decided Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953 (1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823 (1990). In Smith, the appellate court held that a creche
displayed on the front lawn of a county office building violated the Establishment
Clause under Allegheny County. Smith, 895 F.2d at 960. Also, in Chabad-Lubavitch
v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026
(1992), the court held that a proposed display of a menorah in a city park, where
the menorah would be separate from secular aspects of a Christmas display, violated
the Establishment Clause. Chabad-Lubavitch, 936 F.2d at 111-12. Both Smith and
Chabad-Lubavitch relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's holding in Allegheny
County. See Chabad-Lubavitch, 936 F.2d at 111-12; Smith, 895 F.2d at 957-59.
152. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2143-44.
153. Id. at 2148.
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endorsement test announced in Lynch, and adopted in Allegheny
County."M Additionally, the Court resurrected the Lemon test
in its analysis as it considered the question of whether the
proposed use of school facilities constitutes an unacceptable
governmental "entanglement" with religion.'55 Applying these
analyses, the Court concluded that to refuse a religious group
access to a school would be a violation of the group's First
Amendment rights, unsupported by the Establishment
Clause. "
It is obvious in reviewing the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence that the issues addressed by the Court
have often exceeded the particularities of the conflicts between
the parties. At the core of the Establishment Clause cases is
posed a single question to the members of the Court. The Court
has been asked, time after time, where the line is to be drawn
between what is an acceptable display of religion and what is
not. Providing the answer to such a question has required the
members of the Court to balance the intricacies of America's
religious traditions against the Framers' enigmatic decree that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion."'57 Inevitably, tension has resulted between the mem-
bers of the Court on this issue, as reflected by the fragmented
opinion in Capitol Square. Although the decision in Capitol
Square is correct, the Justices' opinions reveal little about the
interpretive direction toward which the Court as a whole is headed.'
154. Id.
155. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the Court's employ-
ment of the Lemon test, stating:
As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad,
after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school
attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District .... Over the years,
however, no fewer than five sitting Justices have, in their own opinion, per-
sonally driven pencils through the creature's heart (the author of today's opin-
ion repeatedly), and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so . . . .When we
wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it, when we wish to up-
hold a practice its forbids, we ignore it entirely (citations omitted).
Id. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 2148-49.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
158. On the same day that the Court decided Capitol Square, it also decided
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). In
Rosenberger, the Court considered whether a state university's exclusion of a reli-
gious student group from a program providing funding for the cost of a student pub-
lication was valid in light of the university's interest in complying with the Estab-
lishment Clause. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521. Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy focused upon the question of the university's "neutrality," and analogized
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Amidst the rhetorical dust appeared Justice O'Connor's
endorsement analysis. What is remarkable about the
endorsement test is the proposition upon which it stands. In
Lynch, Justice O'Connor analogized her approach as shifting the
focus from the "speaker," the subject of a Lemon analysis, to the
"listener."5 ' Such an approach acknowledges the rudimentary
principle that any test employed must produce results that
preserve America's religious pluralism. In short, the test must
work to serve the purpose for which it is employed.
According to Justices Scalia and Kennedy, Justice O'Connor's
approach went too far. In Capitol Square, a significant blow was
struck to the endorsement test, as it was limited by the plurality
to cases involving direct governmental action.6 In the wake of
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Allegheny County, where the
unconstitutionality was limited to governmental practices having
a coercive effect, the plurality's limitation of the endorsement
analysis is to be expected."' Discernible from the pattern
established in the opinions authored by Justices Kennedy and
Scalia in Allegheny County and Capitol Square, respectively, is a
desire to protect inviolate the religious traditions historically
the situation to those in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar. Id. at 2518-24. Justice Ken-
nedy expanded the Widmar and Lamb's Chapel holdings, finding that there was no
distinction between a university's allocation of its resources for student use and
subsidization of student publications. Id. at 2524. Justice Kennedy's analysis briefly
visited the "purpose" and "effect" questions raised under the Lemon analysis. Id.
However, his treatment of those issues was not pivotal to the Court's holding. Id. at
2522. Moreover, the Court concluded: -[T]he government has not willfully fostered or
encouraged' any mistaken impression that the student newspapers speak for the
University." Id. at 2523 (quoting Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2448). The Court's
conclusion represented a recognition of the endorsement analysis, but the Court did
not engage in such an analysis in its opinion. Id.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor applied the "endorsement test." Id.
at 2526-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's analysis led her to concur
in the judgment of the Court. Id. at 2526. Thus, Justice O'Connor's successful appli-
cation of the "endorsement test" in this case reinforced the test's usefulness in guid-
ing courts toward rational decisions in Establishment Clause cases. Id.
The dissent, authored by Justice Souter, asserted that the Court's holding
violated the fundamental principle of the Establishment Clause by allowing a state
to fund a religious activity. Id. at 2533 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Considering Rosenberger and Capitol Square, it became apparent that there
is no single analysis favored by the Court. Rather, the individual Justices appeared
to favor application of particular analyses in cases where their employment produced
a desired result. A notable exception to this was Justice O'Connor, who has re-
mained true to the "endorsement test" since her concurrence in Lynch.
159. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
160. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447.
161. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia, the author of the plurality opinion in Capitol
Square, Justice White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Kennedy's con-
curring/dissenting opinion in Allegheny County. Id.
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interwoven into the fabric of "secular" America.'62 As such, it
is evident that this group of Justices will continue to employ
strict scrutiny to those cases involving a direct government
action, and a somewhat lesser standard to cases like Capitol
Square that concern private speech in a public setting.
This approach contrasts sharply with that of Justice O'Connor
and Justice Souter. Justice Souter, in his Capitol Square concur-
rence, asserted that the endorsement test was not new to the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Rather, Justice
Souter acknowledged the Court's attention to societal
perceptions of governmental relation to religion and religious
practices throughout the Establishment Clause cases.'" Thus,
Justice Souter and Justice O'Connor can be expected to continue
to apply heightened scrutiny to all establishment clause cases,
regardless of the "speaker," through the use of the endorsement
test.
The aggregate of the Court's division is unclear, but it is
evident that in the coming years Establishment Clause
interpretation must follow a single path. The endorsement
analysis is promising because it provides courts a useful
analytical framework, tempered by a recognition of the need to
preserve religious freedom through government neutrality.
Unfortunately, however, strict adherence to the endorsement
test will lead the Court to conclude that many of the
"traditional" religious symbols that have been woven into secular
America over time are unconstitutional. Ironically, it thus
appears that the endorsement test's fatal flaw is that it works
too well. Thus, the specter looming before the Court is the
challenge of harmonizing the restrictive results of the
endorsement test with government's traditional religious
practices. The unfortunate result in the interim is a society left
to ponder how the Court will attempt to do so.
Gregory A. Napolitano
162. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Nowhere was this position more clearly es-
poused than in the Marsh decision, where the Court held a legislative tradition of
an opening prayer constitutional despite the holding in Lemon. Id. If the Lemon test
were employed by the majority, undeniably the practice would have been held inval-
id. Id. at 800-01. This "selective" employment of Lemon was addressed specifically by
Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149-50.
163. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2457-60 (Souter, J., concurring).
164. Id.
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